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HAZARDOUS WASTE CLEANUP IN WYOMING: LEGAL
TOOLS AVAILABLE TO THE PRIVATE CITIZEN
For fundamental and deeply rooted psychological reasons, as well
as more mundane utilitarian considerations, it is characteristic of
man to bury that which he fears and wishes to rid himself of. In the
past, this engrained pattern of behavior has generally proven
harmless and, indeed, has often led man to restore to the earth the
substances he had removed from it. In today's industrialized society, however, the routine practice of burying highly toxic chemical
wastes has resulted in serious threats to the environment and to
public health.'
Americans have been burying hazardous wastes 2 in landfills or
depositing them in sludge ponds for a long time,3 but we have only recently
recognized the inherent dangers of the practice and the scope of the potential problem. In 1980, more than 400,000 generators 4 produced 57 million
tons of hazardous waste. 5 According to the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), 32,000 disposal sites in the United States contain potentially dangerous amounts of hazardous waste, and 1,200 to 2,000 of these sites
may pose significant and imminent health hazards.6 EPA estimates 500 to
800 of these facilities are abandoned. 7
Wyoming suffers less acutely from the results of inadequate hazardous
waste disposal practices than do more populous and industrialized states.
When compared to the other forty-nine states and the District of Columbia,
Wyoming was ranked fifty-first (last) in volume of hazardous waste generation.8 EPA's listing of potentially dangerous hazardous waste disposal sites
issued in 1981 included 20 Wyoming locations.9 EPA's list of 418 high
1. United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1057 (D.N.J. 1981), affid, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir.
1982).
2. The term "hazardous waste" is defined in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976) (RCRA) as:
a solid waste, or combination of solid wastes, which because of its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may(A) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible or incapacitating reversible, illness; or
(B) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the
environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed
of, or otherwise managed.
42 U.S.C. § 6903(5). Though the term refers to discarded materials of little economic
value, these substances often could be recycled and reused. See EPSTEIN, BROWN &
POPE, HAZARDOUS WASTE IN AMERICA, note at 257 (1982).
3. About eighty percent of all hazardous waste disposal is accomplished through one of these
disposal methods. Meyer, Compensating Hazardous Waste Victims, 11 ENVTL. L. 689,
691 (1981) (citing [1978] 9 ENVTL. REP. (BNA) 1301-02).
4. Id. at 690.
5. Id. at 690 (citing U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, HAZARDOUS WASTE INFORMATION SW-737 (1981)).
6. Id. (citing COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, THE TENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 181 and n.1 1).
7. Id. at 174.
8. EPSTEIN, BROWN & POPE, supra note 2, at 413 (citing National Wildlife Foundation, The
Toxic Substance Dilemma, EPA grant # T900905-01. Washington, D.C., 1980).
9. Id. at 544-45.
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priority sites eligible for remedial action under Superfund includes the J. H.
Baxter tie treatment plant outside of Laramie, Wyoming. 10 The state is
1
which has polluted Laramie area3
currently pursuing clean-up of that site,
2
groundwater and the Laramie River,' sources of the city's water supply.'
Clearly, the hazardous waste disposal problem does exist in Wyoming.
In this arid land we cannot afford to pollute our rivers and groundwater
supplies. The problem is real, but it is not yet of the magnitude faced by
much of our nation. The people of Wyoming thus have a unique opportunity
to take advantage of national awareness of the potential dangers of hazardous waste disposal and implement remedial measures before the problem
becomes a crisis.
The purpose of this comment is to explore the various remedies to the
hazardous waste problem in Wyoming which might be available to private
citizens or interest groups. The discussion is limited to possible causes of
action to obtain cleanup of hazardous waste disposal sites,' 4 with some
limited tangential consideration of available causes of action to obtain
damages for injury to private property. 15 Specifically excluded from consideration here is the complex area of victim compensation for personal injuries resulting from exposure to hazardous waste.16
The focus of this comment is, of course, legal remedies available to a
private citizen who is concerned about pollution resulting from hazardous
waste disposal. But such are not the only, nor perhaps even the most effective, tools to be considered. Media campaigns, complaints to state and
federal agencies, negotiations with the polluter, and communication with
the legislature are simpler, and certainly less expensive, alternatives. 7
10. The Laramie Daily Boomerang, Jan. 19, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
11. People v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., No. 96-159 (1st J.D. Wyo., filed October __, 1981).
12. The Branding Iron, Jan. 20, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
13.

EXISTING CONDITIONS AND BACKGROUND REPORT FOR THE CITY OF LARAMIE, WYOMING

35-36 (Fall 1982).
14. Toxic substances have historically been disposed of by a variety of methods including incineration, ocean dumping, and deep-well injection. Most such wastes are disposed of in
land fills or waste water impoundments (lagoons or sludge ponds). Meyer, supra note 3,
at 691.
15. As a practical matter the damage remedy is inseparable from the goal of cleanup since the
purpose of money damages is to restore the injured party to a position roughly equivalent
to his position before the damage occurred. Sometimes physical restoration is impossible,
and the next most effective remedy is to replace the damaged property with wholesome
property (i.e., a polluted water supply must be replaced with an alternative source of
water).
16. For an introduction to the issues and policy questions of this difficult area, as well as to
possible causes of action and problems of proof, see S. REP. No. 12, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(report to Congress by Committee established pursuant to § 301(e) (42 U.S.C. § 9651(e))
of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (Supp. V 1981) to study and make recommendations
to Congress regarding compensation of victims of exposure to hazardous wastes); Garrett, Compensating Victims of Toxic Substances: Issues Concerning Proposed Federal
Legislation, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. 10172 (1983); Baurer, Love Canal: Common Law Approaches to a Modern Tragedy, 11 ENVTL. L. 133 (1980); Large & Michie, Proving that
the Strength of the BritishNavy Dependson the Number of OldMaidsin England:AComparisonof Scientific Proofwith Legal Proof 11 ENVTL. L. 555 (1981); Sobel, A Proposal
for the Administrative Compensation of Victims of Toxic Substance Pollution:A Model
Act, 14 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 683 (1977); Meyer, supranote 3.
17. For a brief but helpful summary of how one might orchestrate a non-judicial effort to
clean up a disposal site, see EPSTEIN, BROWN & POPE, supra note 2, at 288-92.
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Private party resort to the courts is costly, time-consuming, and filled with
risk, as will be seen in the discussion below. It is warranted only in the
event the various non-judicial approaches have proven ineffective, and then
only where the individual or interest group understands the magnitude of
the project and is committed to seeing it through.
If all else has failed and private legal action seems warranted, there is
an amazing panoply of alternatives available to the Wyoming practitioner.
Possible federal causes of action include statutory causes of action under
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA),'5 claims
against Superfund 9 under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 20 causes of action against
responsible parties under CERCLA section 10721 and section 106,22 and
causes of action against polluters under various related federal environmental statutes. State causes of action include potential statutory
causes under the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act22 and various
Wyoming nuisance statutes;24 and the traditional common law causes of action of nuisance, trespass, negligence and strict liability for ultrahazardous
activities.
The above summary lists possible causes of action a private party or interest group might bring to obtain cleanup of a hazardous waste disposal
site in Wyoming. As will be seen, case law in the area remains unsettled if it
exists at all. Almost without exception these are theoretical causes of action which, if they are well-presented and argued, stand some chance of
succeeding in a court of law. As will also be seen, the claims most likely to
succeed at the federal level are also the most expensive. The claims one
might bring in Wyoming would all be cases of first impression; they, too,
are risky and expensive.
I. LAYING THE GROUNDWORK
Whatever means one chooses to pursue, the problems of proof in hazardous waste actions are tremendous. Proof that damage has occurred or is
going to occur if something is not done to prevent it, and that it was caused
by improper disposal of hazardous wastes, requires complex tehnological
data gathered by a variety of experts including toxicologists, engineers,
hydrologists and biochemists. 25 The exposed environment and the routes of
exposure must be identified and proved, as must the hazardous substance
involved.2 6
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976).
19. "Superfund" refers to the Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund created under
CERCLA for the purpose of cleaning up releases of hazardous substances into the environment. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9631, 9611, and 9604 (Supp. V 1981).
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (Supp. V 1981).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 9607
(Supp. V 1981).
9

22. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (Supp. V 1981).
23. Wyo. STAT. §§ 35-11-101 to -1104 (1977 & Supp. 1983).
24. Wyo. STAT. § 35-10-101 (1977); Wyo. STAT. § 401(a) (Supp. 1983); and Wyo. STAT. §
6-6-202 (1977 & Supp. 1983).
25. EPSTEIN, BRowN & POPE, supra note 2, at 281. In the case of Reserve Mining Co. v.
EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 502 (8th Cir. 1975), the court described the trial as covering 139 days
over a nine month period of time. One hundred witnesses testified and 1,600 exhibits
were introduced.
26. EPsrEN, BRowN & POPE, supra note 2, at 282-88.
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Scientific and legal standards of proof differ radically. Proof for a
scientist is a demonstration of her hypothesis sufficient to convince her of
its truth.27 In contrast, legal proof is measured by degrees; proximate
cause must be proved even though sicentific data fails to distinguish among
multiple possible causes and statistical evidence is not well received
because it fails to demonstrate causation in a specific instance.28
Given these hurdles, it is imperative that fact gathering be done
thoroughly before any cause of action is instituted, and probably even
before any non-legal resolution is pursued.29 Sources of relevant factual
data include: 1) maps and census data, veterinary and humane society
records; and medical records to determine the affected environment and its
physical and demographic characteristics; 2) records of the suspect
polluter, government records of permits granted or refused, and environmental enforcement agency records to determine the substances and
disposal practices involved; and 3) soil analyses, hydrologic studies,
climatic studies, analysis of the specific disposal site and methods of
disposal employed to evaluate possible routes of exposure.ao In addition to
these sources of specific information, a variety of organizations may provide helpful background information. These include national environmental
organizations, industry trade groups, labor unions, EPA, and the Wyoming
Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ).s1
It is obvious from the above discussion why environmental actions are
so expensive to pursue. In some cases, however, much of the site-specific
technological data may be on file with EPA. RCRA, CERCLA and the
Clean Water Act (FWPCA)32 contain provisions requiring persons who
deal with hazardous substances to maintain records and to make them
available to EPA. 3 Local public health authorities will often conduct tests
of the public water supply if contamination is suspected. 3 4 Complaints to
EPA and state agencies often spur additional agency inspections and factgathering. Thus, much of the data a plaintiff needs to prevail at trial may
be available in existing reports.
27. Large & Michie, supra note 16, at 563.
28. Id. Unfortunately, statistical proof is often the only proof available in environmental
cases. The trial judge in Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975) found
after an extensive and complex trial that EPA had proved imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health (see supra note 25). The Eighth Circuit reversed the trial
court's decision, holding the evidence insufficient to support a finding of substantial endangerment. Id. at 507. The court observed:
[Tihat the medical and scientific conclusions here in dispute clearly lie "on the
frontiers of scientific knowledge." [Cite omitted]. The trial court, not having
any proof of actual harm, was faced with a consideration of 1) the probabilities
of any health harm and 2) the consequences, if any, should the harm actually
occur.
Id. at 519.
29. EPSTEIN, BROWN & POPE, supra note 2, at 280.
30. Id. at 282-86.
31. Id. at 286. For addresses of a number of such organizations, see id., Appendix XI, at 546.
32. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).

33. See RCRA § 3007, 42 U.S.C. § 6927 (1976); RCRA § 3013, 42 U.S.C. § 6934 (1976);
CERCLA § 102,42 U.S.C. § 9602 (Supp. V 1981); FWPCA § 308,33 U.S.C. § 1318 (1976
& Supp. V 1981); and FWPCA § 311(b) (5), 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (b)(5)(1976 &Supp. V 1981).
34. EPSTEIN, BROWN & POPE, supra note 2, at 284.
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II.

FEDERAL CAUSES OF ACTION

A. Statutory
A number of federal statutes pertaining to environmental protection
have been enacted in recent years including the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA)3 6 and the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA).3 6 These particular
statutes are specifically designed to deal with the problems of ongoing
hazardous waste disposal and cleanup of hazardous waste sites where improper disposal methods were utilized in the past. Both provide potential
causes of action for the private citizen.
1. RCRA
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 provides a comprehensive federal program for the regulation of solid waste disposal, with
emphasis on proper hazardous waste disposal.37 RCRA's coverage,
however, is limited to regulation of presently operating disposal sites and
persons who are currently active in the generation or hauling of hazardous
waste materials.33 The statute requires anyone who treats, stores or
disposes of hazardous wastes to obtain a permit.3 9 In order to procure a
permit, one must demonstrate compliance with standards established by
EPA for hazardous waste management. 40 If any person subject to the Act's
coverage operates without a permit or operates in violation of a material
provision of a permit, he is subject to civil penalties of up to $25,000 for
each day of continued
non-compliance, 41 and may also be subject to
42
prosecution.
criminal
As does nearly every federal environmental statute, 43 RCRA contains a
provision authorizing private citizens to bring civil actions in federal
district court for violations of "any permit, standard, regulation, condition,
requirement or order" issued under the statute.4 The purpose of these provisions is to provide additional enforcement mechanisms for regulatory
statutes too comprehensive to be enforced
by a single government agency
46
of limited resources and manpower.
42 U.S.C. §9 6901-6987 (1976).
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (Supp. V 1981).
For the RCRA definition of "hazardous waste," see supranote 2.
See 42 U.S.C. § 6902(3), (4) and (5) (1976).
42 U.S.C. § 6925(a) (1976).
42 U.S.C. § 6925(a) and § 6924 (1976).
42 U.S.C. § 6928(a) (1976).
42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1976).
See, e.g., FWPCA § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1976); Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604
(1976); Endangered Species Act § 11(g), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1982); and Toxic Substances
Control Act § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1982).
44. RCRA § 7002(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1976). This section also authorizes suits against the
Administrator of EPA for failure to perform non-discretionary duties under the Act.
45. See comments by Senator Muskie from Sept. 21, 1970, Legislative History at 280-81, set
out in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1975). At
least that is one view of the purpose of allowing citizen suits to enforce environmental
legislation. A contrasting motivation was stated in Senate Committee Report No.
91-1196, set out at 510 F.2d at 723 as follows:
Government initiative in seeking enforcement under the Clean Air Act has
been restrained. Authorizing citizens to bring suits for violations of standards
should motivate governmental agencies charged with the responsibility to
bring enforcement and abatement proceedings.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
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The citizen suit provisions in the various environmental statutes46 differ only slightly, and the reasons for enacting each were identical to the
reasons for enacting the original citizen suit provision of the Clean Air
Act. 47 Therefore, precedent construing the provision of one such statute
should be given equal weight in construing others. 48 The issue of standing
to sue is arguably an exception to this general rule, but as will be seen, the
exception, if it exists, is practically immaterial.
49
Standing to bring an action under RCRA is given to "any person."
60
This is also the case under the Clean Air Act, but the Clean Water Act
creates a cause of action for "any citizen" 61 and defines "citizen" as "a per6 2
son or persons having an interest which is or may be adversely affected."
This definition is a direct adoption of the standing requirements enunciated
in Sierra Club v. Morton,53 as was recognized and confirmed by the
Supreme Court in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea
Clammers Association. 4 Standing under the Sierra Club standard is
available even though the alleged injury to the individual is aesthetic in
nature and is no greater than the generalized injury to many other
people. 56 As a practical matter, it can probably be obtained by anyone who
may be in any way adversely affected by an alleged environmental harm if
the pleadings are carefully enough drawn. It is not available, however, to
an environmental organization which brings suit "merely" in the public interest.56 Here lies the difference between the Sierra Club standing requirement and the apparent standing criteria under RCRA or the Clean Air Act
in which Congress expressly conferred enforcement powers on "any person." 5 7 Arguably, Congress has created the case in controversy by giving
any member of the public, including environmental organizations, the
no specific injury beyond inpower to bring enforcement actions and thus
58
jury to the public interest need be alleged.

The issue is thus whether in the area of standing the citizen suit provisions of the various acts should all be construed as enshrining the Sierra
Club standard, or whether Congress intended by the different language
used to create different standing requirements. Even if Congress did
46. See supra note 43.

47. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 515 F. Supp. 961 (D.D.C. 1981), revd on other grounds,
689 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
48. Id. See also Save Our Sound Fisheries Ass'n v. Callaway, 429 F. Supp. 1136 (D.R.I. 1977).
Thus, in discussing the use of this vital provision, cases concerning questions arising
under the various federal governmental statutes will be cited without distinguishing them
from RCRA cases.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1976). Under § 1004, 42 U.S.C. § 6903(15) (1976), "person" is defined broadly to include "an individual, trust, firm, joint stock company, corporation (including a government corporation), partnership, association, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body."
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1976).
51. § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1976).
52. § 505(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (1976).
53. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
54. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
55. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412
U.S. 669 (1973).
56. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
57. See supra note 49.
58. Miller, Private Enforcement of FederalPollution Control Laws, Part I, 13 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10309 (1983).
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intend to create a lower standing requirement it is doubtful it has power to
do so. s9 The Supreme Court in SierraClub and cases cited therein, seemed
to say that injury in fact is a constitutional requirement.6 ° If so, Congress is
without power to waive it.
The question is important because, as a practical matter, it would be
much easier and therefore desirable to allege standing in an environmental
group based on vindication of the public interest. The lines between constitutional and jurisprudential standing requirements are not clear, so an
environmental plaintiff might make a case for general standing under
citizen suit provisions. But while this would be appropriate as a test case,
most plaintiffs will be well-advised to plead in conformity with the Sierra
Club standard rather than risk the expense of a dismissal for lack of
standing.
Under the citizen suit provision of RCRA, a private individual is empowered to bring an action to enforce the Act. The provision requires an individual who desires to bring an action to give EPA notice of the violation
at least sixty days prior to filing the complaint. 61 In addition, no citizen suit
may be brought at all "if the Administrator or State has commenced and is
diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the United
States or a State to require compliance with such permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, or order."6 2 These requirements exist to
allow the agency to do its job; they give the agency time to act on alleged
violations itself.6
For purposes of the notice provision, administrative enforcement proceedings before an agency are equivalent to civil actions before a court only
if the agency is "empowered to grant relief which will provide meaningful
and effective enforcement of an implementation plan." ' 64 If Congress provided in the statute for both penalties and injunctive relief, the administrative tribunal must have the power to grant both. Otherwise, it is
not a "court" for purposes of preventing a citizen suit, and the prosecution
of an enforcement proceeding at the agency level will not foreclose filing of
a civil action in a court of law.65
RCRA was designed as a regulatory statute to manage ongoing hazardous waste disposal. Clearly, a private individual is empowered to bring
suit to enforce permit terms and to prevent disposal without a permit so
long as she complies with the procedural requirements of the statute.
59. In Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), the Sierra Club sought standing to vindicate the general public interest. The Supreme Court refused to grant standing without
an allegation of specific harm to its individual members.
60. 405 U.S. at 733.
61. RCRA § 7002(b) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b) (1) (1976).
62. RCRA § 7002(b) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b) (2) (1976).
63. See S. REP. No. 91-1196 at 36-39, set out in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Train, 510 F.2d 692, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
64. Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., Inc., 592 F.2d 215, 218 (3d Cir. 1979).
65. Id.
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RCRA was not designed, however, to remedy the larger and immediate
problem of closed and abandoned hazardous waste disposal sites 6 -those
sites which are presently leaking toxic chemicals into the nation's rivers
and aquifers.67 But when it was enacted in 1976 there was no federal
statute in existence which purported to regulate closed or abandoned waste
dumps. As a result, section 700368 of RCRA, the statute's imminent hazard
provision, was pressed into service by the federal government in attempts
to avert public health disasters threatened by leakage from abandoned
waste sites into municipal water supplies.69 For the most part, courts held
that section 7003 could be used to attempt to remedy these severe problems
caused by abandoned or closed sites.7 0 Some refused to extend RCRA to
beyond its purpose even in the face of the
cover what was obviously
7
threatened danger. '
Even if a court is willing to extend section 7003 to cover abandoned
sites, the provision is probably not available to a private individual. By its
72
own terms, it empowers only the Administrator of EPA to bring suit.
Furthermore, the legislative history is clear that Congress authorized
citizen suits only for the purpose of enforcing specific standards established
by statute or by EPA. 78 RCRA contains no express provisions governing
abandoned or closed (as of 1976 when RCRA was enacted) waste sites, nor
does it authorize EPA to promulgate regulations governing them.7 4 The
issues which would have to be determined by a court in such a suit are just
exactly the sort of complex, technical issues
that Congress expressly
75
wanted to avoid in a citizen suit litigation.
RCRA, therefore, provides a viable cause of action to the individual
who seeks to remedy a problem created by an operating facility if the facility is in violation of its RCRA permit, or if it has failed to procure a permit.
It probably does not provide a remedy for the problems caused by a closed
or abandoned site.
66. United States v. Waste Industries, 556 F. Supp. 1301, 1307 (E.D.N.C. 1982); United
States v. Wade (Wade I), 546 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
67. Superfund at Square One: PromisingStatutory FrameworkRequires Forceful EPA Implementation, ENVTL. L. REP. 10101, 10102 (1981).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1976).
69. For example, in United States v. Price (Price I), 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981), affd,
688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982), EPA sought to remedy the pollution of the water supply of
Atlantic City, New Jersey.
70. See, e.g., United States v. Price (Price I), 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981), ajfd, 688 F.2d
204 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100 (D.
Minn. 1982).

71. See, e.g., United States v. Waste Industries, 556 F. Supp. 1301 (E.D.N.C. 1982); United
States v. Wade (Wade I), 546 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
72. "Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter,. . . the Administrator may bring
suit on behalf of the United States .. " 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (1976).
73. The provision . .. is carefully restricted to actions where violations of standards and
regulations... are alleged.
[The citizen suit provision) would not substitute a "common law" or court-

developed [standard]... [and) would not require reanalysis of technological or
other considerations at the enforcement stage .... [Ain objective evidentiary
standard would have to be met by the citizen who brings an action under this
section.
S. REP. No. 91-1196 at 36-39 (cited in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train,
510 F.2d 692, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).

74. United States v. Waste Industries, 556 F. Supp. 1301, 1307 n.11 (E.D.N.C. 1982).
75. See supra note 73 for the relevant legislative history.
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2. CERCLA
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act16 was enacted in 1980 to provide for prompt cleanup of hazardous waste disposal sites. 771 The Act establishes the Superfund.7 8 It also
gives private 79parties the right to recover costs of cleanup from responsible
third parties.
The Superfund is a 1.6 billion dollar trust fund funded by taxes on industry and contributions from the federal government.80 Any person who
has incurred response costs in cleaning up a hazardous waste dumpsite may
be eligible to recover against the Fund, provided the costs have been approved under the national contingency plan and have been certified by the
responsible federal officer. 81 In order to proceed against the Fund, the party must 1) incur the response costs, 82 2) make a claim for the costs to the
responsible party,"' and84then, if the claim is not satisfied within sixty days,
present it to the Fund.
85
Claims against the fund are made to an administrative board.
CERCLA provides no standards directing the agency's discretion in
awarding claims.86 If the claim is denied, it is submitted to a Board of Arbitrators for review.87 Decisions of the Board may be appealed to the
federal district court.88 If the claim is paid, the rights of the claimant
for recovery of his response costs are subrogated to
against any third party
89
the United States.

As an alternative to a claim against Superfund, CERCLA provides a
cause of action against the responsible party to private individuals who incur response costs. 90 There are three categories of responsible persons: 1)
present and former site owners, 2) transporters of hazardous wastes, and
3) those who arrange for transport and disposal (generators).91 Under
CERCLA section 107(j), 92 compliance with a permit under other federal environmental legislation precludes recovery pursuant to CERCLA.
76. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).

77. City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1142-43 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
78. See supra note 19.
79. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (Supp. V 1981). See also Philadelphia v. Stepan
Chemical Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
80. Superfund at Square One, supra note 67, at 10102.
81. CERCLA § 111(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a) (Supp. V 1981).
82. Id.
83. CERCLA § 112(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9612(a) (Supp. V 1981).
84. Id.
85. CERCLA § 112(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9612(b) (Supp. V 1981).
86. Id.
87. CERCLA § 112(b) (3) and (b)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9612(b) (3) and (b) (4) (Supp. V 1981).
88. CERCLA § 112(b) (4) (G), 42 U.S.C. § 9612(b) (4) (G)(Supp. V 1981).
89. CERCLA § 112(c) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9612(c) (1) (Supp. V 1981).
90.
In any case where the claim has not been satisfied within sixty days of presentation... the claimant may elect to commence an action in court against [the
responsible party] or to present the claim to the Fund for payment.
CERCLA § 112(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9612(a) (Supp. V 1981).
91. Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982); CERCLA §
107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. V 1981).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(j) (Supp. V 1981).
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Just as with claims against Superfund, the individual must first incur
the response costs before she can assert a claim against the responsible
party.93 This requirement has been construed broadly to include costs incurred up to the date of the damages hearing, and costs for services which
have been contracted but have not yet been actually paid.9 4
Liability under CERCLA is strict in the sense that negligence or intent
need not be proved to render a party responsible for costs of cleanup. 9 5
However, section 107(b) 96 provides three affirmative defenses which, if
proved, are complete defenses against all liability. 97
As discussed above, proof of causation is one of the most difficult
burdens an environmental plaintiff must bear.9 8 The only court which has
thus far considered what is required to prove causation under CERCLA
has lessened this burden considerably-the court in United States v. Wade
(Wade 1I) 99 construed the language of section 107(a) 100 to require only a
showing that waste generated by the person sought to be charged was
disposed of at the site in question, and that wastes of that type continue to
be present at the site. 10 1 Most significantly, the environmental plaintiff is
not required to prove that the cleanup measures relate to a release of the
same type of waste that the defendant caused to be placed at the site. 102
Any release which necessitates a cleanup creates a cause of action against
site
any person who has ever disposed of hazardous wastes at the particular
03
if such wastes were of a variety currently found at the site.
While recovery under Superfund is strictly limited to response costs
which have been approved and certified in accordance with the national
contingency plan, 10 4 recovery against reponsible parties may be had of all
costs which are merely consistent with the plan. 10 5 The "consistency"
determination is made by the court and is not limited to just those 10costs
7
which would be payable, under section 111,106 out of the Superfund.
A private party may be able to recover response costs from a third party under section 107 even if she herselfmight be liable to another for costs
93. CERCLA § 107(a) (4) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (B) (Supp. V 1981); United States v.
Price (Price III), 13 ENVTL. L. REP. 20843 (D.N.J. 1983); United States v. Wade (Wade I1),
546 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
94. United States v. Wade (Wade II), No. 79-1426, memo. op. of Dec. 20, 1983 (E.D. Pa.

1983).

95. City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1140 (E.D. Pa. 1982). See
also United States v. Price (Price III), 13 ENVWL. L. REP. 20843 (D.N.J. 1983); and
United States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (Supp. V 1981).
97. Id. Section 107(b) defenses include acts of God, acts of war and acts of third parties which
are the sole cause of the release and damage.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 25-28.
99. No. 79-1426, memo. op. of Dec. 20, 1983 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. V 1981).
101. No. 79-1426, memo. op. of Dec. 20, 1983 at 9 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See supra text accompanying note 81.
105. CERCLA § 107(a) (4) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (B) (Supp. V 1981).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (Supp. V 1981).
107. United States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1117-18 (D. Minn.

1982).
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of cleanup.' 08 A private party cannot recover for damages to natural
resources caused by the release. 109
All CERCLA claims are subject to a three year statute of limitations.1 0
The statute runs from the date of discovery of the loss.'
CERCLA is a statute tailor-made to enable cleanup of closed or abandoned hazardous waste disposal sites. It provides a cause of action against
a broad range of responsible parties"1 2 or a claim against a government
trust fund. 113 Liability is strict, proof of causation has been rendered simple, and a broad spectrum of costs are recoverable at the discretion of the
court. 114 But CERCLA has one very large drawback: the statutory
language is clear that cleanup costs mustfirst be incurred before they can
be recovered. 115 It is a rare environmental plaintiff who has the resources
to cleanup first and recover later.
As a result, EPA has attempted to use the imminent hazard provision
of CERCLA 1"6 in much the same way it has employed section 7003 of
RCRA" 7 to obtain injunctions mandating cleanup of abandoned hazardous
waste sites.11B The few courts which have considered the question have
split in whether to allow the action. 119 It seems clear Congress did not intend for section 106(a) 120 to be employed to directly circumvent the restrictions on the cause of action it expressly granted in section 107;121 yet, as a
matter of policy, if closed waste sites are to be cleaned up at all there must
be some way to make those responsible for their existence clean them up
themselves. 122 For this reason some courts have been willing to allow the
cause of action to stand, with liability determined on the same basis as
107123 or under general principles of the common law of
under section
24
nuisance.1
A private environmental plaintiff faces an additional hurdle in pursuing
an action under section 106(a):' 25 CERCLA, unlike nearly every other piece
108. See City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1141 (E.D. Pa. 1982),
where the court held the municipal owner of the landfill could recover against generators
of hazardous wastes illegally disposed of at the site even though it might be held liable
under CERCLA for response costs incurred by another.
109. CERCLA § 107(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (Supp. V 1981).
110. CERCLA § 113(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(d) (Supp. V 1981).
111. Id.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 90-92.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 81-89.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 95-97.
115. See CERCLA § 107(a) (4) (B),
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (B) (Supp. V 1981); and CERCLA §
1
111(a) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 961 (a) (2) (Supp. V 1981).

116. CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (Supp. V 1981).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1976).
118. See United States v. Price (Price III), 13 ENVTL. L. REP. 20843 (D.N.J. 1983); United
States v. Wade (Wade I), 546 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1982); and United States v. Reilly
Tar & Chemical Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982).
119. Id. In PriceIII and ReiUy Tar, the court upheld a cause of action based on CERCLA §
106(a); but in Wade L the court refused to use § 106(a) to overcome the obvious restriction imposed on plaintiffs by § 107.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (Supp. V 1981).
121. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (B) (Supp. V 1981).
122. United States v. Price (Price 11), 13 ENVTL. L. REP. 20843, 20846 (D.N.J. 1983).
123. Id. at 20847.
124. United States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1113 (D. Minn, 1982).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (Supp. V 1981).
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of federal environmental legislation, contains no citizen suit provision. 126
Further, the language of section 106(a) gives a cause of action only to the
federal government. Whether a private plaintiff can maintain a cause of action under section 1331127 general federal question jurisdiction is a question
yet to be litigated.
8. Other federal environmental statutes

In addition to RCRA and CERCLA, which deal specifically with hazardous wastes, a number of other federal environmental statutes may be of
use in a specific case. 128 Of these, the Clean Water Act 12 9 is most frequently
employed. It should be noted that its coverage is limited to "navigable
waters,"'' 30 which does not include most groundwater.18 ' The Clean Water
Act does not regulate water pollution caused by percolation, but instead
32
leaves regulation of "non-point source" pollution to the individual states.1
These statutes are available to private individuals for enforcement actions under their respective citizen suit provisions.'5 8
4. Recovery of costs and attorneyfees under federal environmental
legislation
The citizen suit provisions contained in the various environmental
statutes8 4 provide for recovery of costs and attorney fees "whenever the
court determines such an award is appropriate.' 8 6 The plain language of
these statutes suggests the award of costs and fees is in the discretion of
the court, and might be determined by the value to the general public of
having a close question of law litigated irregardless of whether the environmental plaintiff prevails on the merits.3 6 But in a recent five to four
decision the Supreme Court held that no costs or fees can be awarded an
environmental plaintiff who does not prevail at least to some extent on the
merits. 5 7
126. See supra text accompanying note 43.
127. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. V 1981).
128. Other federal statutes governing toxic wastes include the Toxic Substances Control Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982); the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981); the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300(f) (1976); the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136Y (1982); and the Uranium
Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7901-7942 (Supp. V 1981).
129. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1977 & Supp. V 1981).
130. See FWPCA § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1977) (discharge of pollutant unlawful); and §
502-12, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (1977) ("discharge of a pollutant" means addition of a pollutant to "navigable waters").
131. See, e.g., Exxon v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310 (5th Cir. 1977).
132. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 546 F.2d 573 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
133. The uses and limitations of citizen suit provisions in general are described supra,in text
accompanying notes 4365, and infra, in text accompanying notes 134-37.
134. See supra note 43.
135. RCRA § 7002(e), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e) (1976). See as another example FWPCA § 505(d), 33
U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1976).
136. See the dissenting opinion in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, U.S. __,
103 S.Ct. 3274,
3285-86 (1983). Legislative history supports this construction. A Senate Committee
Report on the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act stated:
The Courts should recognize that in bringing legitimate actions under this section citizens would be performing a public service and in such instances the
court should award costs of litigation to such party.
S. REP. No. 91-1196 at 36-39 (quoted in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train,
510 F.2d 692, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
137. Id. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club construed the citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act.
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5. Section 1831 federal questionjurisdictionover claims based on
environmental statutes
On occasion, environmental plaintiffs have brought actions based on
asserted violations of environmental statutes, but have failed to comply
with the sixty day notice requirement of the various citizen suit
provisions. 138 The Supreme Court in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority
v. NationalSea Clammers Association,19 implied that no general federal
question jurisdiction exists to allow claims based on violations of the Clean
Water Act and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of
1972 (MPRSA),140 absent
compliance with the sixty day notice provisions
4
required by the Acts.' 1
Of course, this problem is avoided simply by giving the requisite notice
in compliance with statutory requirements.
B. Implied Causes of Action Based on EnvironmentalLegislation
Closely related to the federal question jurisdiction issue is the question
whether the various federal environmental statutes create implied causes
of action for damages. The citizen suit provisions contain savings clauses
preserving "any right which any person... may have under any statute or
common law to seek enforcement of any standard or requirement... or to
seek any other relief ....",142 Environmental plaintiffs have attempted to
use these clauses, as well as the statutes themselves, to imply private
causes of action for damages to property, livelihood and person. 143 The
Supreme Court, in Sea Clammers, refused to recognize an implied right of
action based on the Clean Water Act and MPRSA. 144 It stated that the key
inquiry is whether Congress intended to create private rights to damages
in individuals when it enacted the statute, and that the comprehensive
nature of these statutes, as well as the inclusion of a citizen suit provision,
was evidence Congress did not intend to provide a damage remedy. 14 5 The
court refused to construe the savings clause to create a cause of action for
damages based on the very statute it was a part of. 14
138. See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association,
453 U.S. 1 (1981); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C.
Cir. 1975). See supra text accompanying notes 59-65, for a discussion of the 60-day notice
requirement.
139. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
140. 83 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1444 (1977 & Supp. V 1981).
141. Though the issue was not raised on appeal and therefore was not expressly considered in
the Court's opinion, such a holding would be consistent with the Court's refusal to
recognize implied causes of action arising out of the Acts in question. See infra text accompanying notes 142-148. Further, the Court was reversing the Third Circuit's express
holding that a cause of action could be maintained despite failure to give the required sixty days notice to defendant. See 453 U.S. at 8-11.
142. RCRA § 7002(f), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(f) (1977); see also, e.g., FWPCA § 606(e), 33 U.S.C. §
1365(e) (1977).
143. Sea Clammers was an action to recover damages for harm to the fishing and shellfish industry caused by pollution of the ocean.
144. 453 U.S. at 14.
145. Id. at 13-15.
146. Id. at 15-16.
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Because of the similarity of the various environmental statutes and
their citizen suit provisions,"17 the Sea Clammers14holding will no doubt extend throughout the field of environmental law.
C. FederalCommon Law
The savings clauses of the various environmental citizen suit provisions
expressly preserve common law remedies in addition to the remedies
granted by statute.149 For purposes of construing these clauses, the courts
have distinguished between federal common law and state common law. 160
Federal courts lack any general power to develop common law.' 6 ' They
do possess limited authority to develop common law if Congress hasn't
legislated in an area, and if federal policy interests preclude the use of state
common law (as when the dispute involves two states). 1 2 Federal common
law is always subject to the paramount authority of Congress. 153 Enactment of legislation which comprehends an area previously governed by
federal common law causes the law to "disappear." 154
The Supreme Court, in Illinois v. Milwaukee (MilwaukeeI), 15 recognized the existence of a general federal common law of nuisance to resolve interstate water pollution problems. When the same case again reached the
Supreme Court nearly ten years later, 16 the Clean Water Act legislation
was in place, and the Court found Congress had "occupied the field [of
water pollution control] through the establishment of a comprenebsive
157
regulatory program supervised by an expert administrative agency,"'
and thus there was "no room for courts to attempt to improve on that program with federal common law."' 618 Milwaukee 11 denied a common law
claim for injunctive relief based on statutory pre-emption. 5 9 The Sea Clammers 60 decision issued later that same year went even further in holding
the federal common law was completely pre-empted in the water pollution
6
area by federal environmental legislation.'
' Thus, no federal common law
18 2
action for damages remains either.
As is only logical, these decisions have been extended to the field of
hazardous waste regulation. Thus, RCRA and CERCLA have been 163
found
to pre-empt federal common law in the area of toxic waste disposal.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
148. In general, the current Supreme Court views implied rights of action with disfavor, and
has limited them whenever possible. See, e.g., California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287
(1981); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
149. See supra text accompanying note 142.
150. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982),
where the court disallowed the federal common law claim, but held causes of action could
be maintained under state common law theories.
151. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
152. Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 313 (1981).
153. Id. at 314.
154. Id.
155. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
156. Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
157. Id. at 317.
158. Id. at 319.
159. Id.
160. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1147-48 (E.D. Pa. 1982);
United States v. Price (Price I), 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1069 (D.N.J. 1981).
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III. STATE CAUSES OF ACTION

Up to this point discussion has centered on federal causes of action
which must be brought in federal court. 16 4 In contrast, claims based on
state law may be brought in state court, or they may be heard in federal
court in conjunction with federal claims under pendent jurisdiction. 165 The
State of Wyoming has almost no environmental case law,166 but the two
cases which have reached the Wyoming Supreme Court have been decided
in favor of environmental plaintiffs. 1 67 While two cases can hardly be deemed conclusive indicia of how the court will rule on other environmental
cases in the future, they do stand as encouragement to plaintiffs to develop
Wyoming case law in the environmental field.
A. Statutory Causes of Action in Wyoming
1. The Wyoming Environmental Quality Act'l 8
The Wyoming Environmental Quality Act (WEQA), 16 9 a comprehensive environmental statute governing air, land and water quality, includes
a citizen suit provision which is worded much the same as its counterparts
in federal statutes. 1'70 Like its federal counterparts, WEQA provides to1 7the
private citizen a cause of action to enjoin alleged violations of the act; ' it
requires a plaintiff to give the alleged violator sixty days notice of the
claim; 72 it forecloses the bringing of an action if the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) has already commenced a civil action to enjoin
the same violation;7 3 it provides for recovery of costs of litigation on the
same terms as do the federal statutes; 1'7 4 and it contains a savings clause
which preserves existing civil and criminal remedies.'7 5
Because it is so similar to federal citizen suit provisions, the citizen suit
provision of WEQA would appear to extend the same sort of enforcement
authority as is extended to private persons under federal environmental
legislation. Its coverage, however, is extremely unclear.
Section 35-11-902 of the Wyoming Statutes' 76 was passed by the
Wyoming Legislature in 1980 as part of an act which extensively amended
the original WEQA.' 7 7 The purpose and focus of the amendment was to
164. See. e.g., RCRA § 7002(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1976), which provides that "any action
[against a violator] shall be brought in the district court for the district in which the alleged violation occurred." (emphasis added).
165. United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
166. The only two environmental cases decided thus far by the Wyoming Supreme Court are
Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. v. Elmore Livestock Co., 669 P.2d 505 (Wyo. 1983); and People v. Platte Pipe Line Co., 649 P.2d 208 (Wyo. 1982). Both construe provisions of the
Wyoming Environmental Quality Act, Wyo. STAT. §§ 35-11-101 to -1104 (1977 & Supp.
1983).
167. Id.
168. Wyo. STAT. §§ 35-11-101 to -1104 (1977 & Supp. 1983).
169. Id.
170. WYo. STAT. § 35-11-902 (Supp. 1983).
171. Wyo. STAT. § 35-11-902(a) (i) (Supp. 1983).
172. WYo. STAT. § 35-11-902(c) (i) (Supp. 1983).
173. WYO. STAT. § 35-11-902(c) (ii) (Supp. 1983).
174. WYO. STAT. § 35-11-902(e) (Supp. 1983).
175. WYO. STAT. § 35-11-902(g) (Supp. 1983).
176. Wyo. STAT. § 35-11-902 (Supp. 1983).
177. See 1980 WYO. SEss. LAWS Ch. 64.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1984

15

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 19 [1984], Iss. 2, Art. 2
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XIX

obtain regulatory authority under the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMRCA).' 7T The citizen suit provision of WEQA
references the SMRCA citizen suit provision,179 and is certainly susceptible
to a literal construction that it applies only to violations of the surface mining provisions. When viewed in light of the fact that section 902 was part of
a much more extensive act amending the WEQA, Is0 the reference of subsection (a) ' 81 to "this act" may be understood as limited to the amending
act and its provisions only, rather than to the entire Wyoming Environmental Quality Act.
Based on the foregoing, it is certainly arguable that the Wyoming
Legislature intended the citizen suit provision to relate only to the surface
mining provisions of the WEQA. But in Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. v.
Elmore Livestock Co., a decision which did not discuss the section's history,
the Wyoming Supreme Court held it is available for use by a private citizen
to remedy a groundwater pollution problem. 182 It would therefore appear
the citizen suit vehicle is available to enforce any provision of, or regulation
under, the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act.
Such a construction is supported by public policy. Citizen suit provisions were originally included in federal legislation to provide an additional
means by which our environment can be preserved and improved.18 8 The
legislative history of the federal Clean Water Act indicates that Congress
contemplated states would be required to include citizen enforcement
authority in their legislation in order to get permitting and enforcement
authority under the Act,' 8 4 and one court has overturned EPA approval of
a state program for failure to include a citizen suit provision.18 5 EPA
regulations which require inclusion of such provisions in state legislation
have been upheld under SMRCA. 186
The primary cause of action a private person might bring in a state
court in the area of hazardous waste disposal would be an action based on
state RCRA enforcement authority. As of this writing, Wyoming has not
obtained this authority.' 8 7 The WEQA provisions covering hazardous
waste disposal are extremely limited, but may provide an action in particular circumstances. 188
178. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1328 (Supp. V 1981).
179. See Wyo. STAT. § 35-11-902(a) (Supp. 1983), which refers to 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (Supp. V
1981).
180. 1980 Wyo. SEss. LAWS Ch. 64.
181. Wyo. STAT. § 35-11-902(a) (Supp. 1983).
182. 669 P.2d 505 (Wyo. 1983).
183. See supra text accompanying note 45.
184.
I sincerely hope that the Administrator understands that this applies across the
board, including the establishment of the permit program under section 402 of
the bill.
Remarks of Representative Dingell (quoted in Citizens for a Better Environment v. EPA,
596 F.2d 720, 724, reh'g denied, (7th Cir. 1979)
185. 596 F.2d at 724.
186. In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 10 ENvTL. L. REP. 20208 (D.D.C.
1980), affd en banc., 653 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 822 (1981).
187. Cf WYo. STAT. §§ 35-11-501 to -503 (1977). See also BELFIGLIO, LIPPE & FRANKLIN,
HAZARDOUS WASTE DisPosAL SrrEs, 69-70 (1981).
188. See Wyo. STAT. §§ 35-11-501 to -503 (1977). management under present Wyoming law
relates only to newly constructed sites, therefore, only sites opened since the law's enactment in 1973 are required to obtain permits.
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Wyoming does have permitting authority under the Clean Water
Act. 189 Coverage encompasses "waters of the State," including groundwater. 90 "Discharge" is any addition of pollution to waters of the State.'91
Unlike the federal Clean Air Act, the WEQA does not limit its permit requirements to "point sources" of pollutants.1 92 Thus, the water quality provisions of WEQA are an excellent vehicle to remedy hazardous waste
disposal problems where one can show water is being contaminated.
Civil liability under WEQA is strict, and there are no defenses.' 93 The
Act provides for assessment of damages and civil penalties, and for injunctions against continued violations.' 94 It does not provide specifically for
cleanup costs, but such costs could arguably be assessed as damages. 9 5
Like its federal counterparts, the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act
forbids citizen suits if DEQ "has commenced a civil action to require compliance."' 96 The meaning of "civil action" for purposes of the WEQA has
not yet been determined by the Wyoming Supreme Court. Of some
relevance to this issue is the court's decision in People v. Fremont Energy
Corporation.97 In construing the powers of DEQ to enforce the WEQA,
the court held the agency was not required to first exhaust its potential administrative remedies before it could commence a court action seeking civil
penalties. 98 Since this is the case, it cannot be argued that failure of DEQ
99
to commence a judicial action after receipt of notice under 901(c) (i)1
is excusable because it is first required to proceed administratively against the
alleged violator. Because DEQ can proceed directly to court if it so chooses,
"civil action" in 901(c) (ii)200
should be construed as a judicial proceeding in
a court of law.
This construction is in accord with federal construction of citizen suit
provisions.2 0' The Environmental Quality Council does not possess the
remedial powers of a court in that it cannot collect civil penalties except
through a civil action,202 nor can it assess damages.208 Since it is not the
functional equivalent of a court, it should not be treated as one for purposes
of barring citizen suits under the WEQA.
189. See Wyo.
190.
191.
192.
193.

STAT.

§§ 35-11-301 to -303 (1977 & Supp. 1983).

Wyo. STAT. § 35-11-103(c) (i), (vi) and (vii) (1977).
WYo. STAT. § 35-11-103(c) (vii) (1977).
Wyo. STAT. § 35-11-301 (1977 & Supp. 1983)
People v. Platte Pipe Line Co., 649 P.2d 208, 213 (Wyo. 1982). "[Ifa person alters the

waters' quality without a permit, he then has violated the statute, regardlessoffault. "Id.
at 213. (Emphasis in original).
194. Wyo. STAT. § 35-11-901 (Supp. 1983). See also People v. Platte Pipe Line Co., 649 P.2d
208, 214 (Wyo. 1982).

195. In Belle Fourche, the trial court had awarded damages based on costs of cleaning up the
contaminated ground water. The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the award because
the plaintiff had failed to comply with the sixty day notice requirement of the WEQA
citizen suit provision, but did not comment on whether the measure of damages applied
by the trial court was appropriate. 669 P.2d at 511.
196. Wyo. STAT. § 35-11-902(c) (ii) (Supp. 1983).
197. 651 P.2d 802 (Wyo. 1982).
198. Id. at 811.
199. WYo. STAT. § 35-11-902(c) (i) (Supp. 1983).
200. Wyo. STAT. § 35-11-902(c) (ii) (Supp. 1983).
201. See supratext accompanying notes 63-65.
202. Wyo. STAT. § 35-11-901(a) (Supp. 1983).
203. Wyo. STAT. § 35-11-901(b) (Supp. 1983).
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The language employed in stating criteria for awarding litigation costs
under the WEQA is the same as the language used in its federal counterparts.2 0 4 "The court... may award costs of litigation, (including attorney
and expert witness fees), to any party whenever [it] determines such an
award is appropriate. ' 20 5 There is no case law in Wyoming construing this
provision. As noted above, the federal provisions have been construed to
require that a party must prevail on at least some part of the merits to
receive an award of costs. 20 6 The Wyoming provision providing for cost
awards in general civil actions207 also employs broad language which
arguable could be construed to allow an award of costs even to a party who
loses on the merits, 208 but it has never been so interpreted. 20 9
An environmental plaintiff who does not prevail would certainly want
to argue that the public interest was served just by having the particular
issue litigated, and that an award of costs is therefore warranted under the
broad terms of section 35-11-902(e). 210 Federal precedent and Wyoming
case law construing the state's general costs provision indicate these
arguments may be unsuccessful.
2. Wyoming nuisance statutes
There are several nuisance statutes relating to littering and water
pollution in the Wyoming statutes, 211 but they provide little help in the area
of hazardous waste cleanup.
In general, Wyoming nuisance statutes provide for abatement and
minor penalties. 212 Enforcement is vested in public officials.213 As a matter
of policy,
214 such statutes might not apply if the nuisance is governed by

WEQA.

These statutes may have a limited usefulness on the right facts. If
abatement is the only remedy sought, and if the WEQA does not seem applicable, 21 5 the environmental plaintiff might be able to maintain a cause of
action to enforce these provisions. The Wyoming statutes covering
nuisances such as gambling and prostitution allow private citizens to sue
for enforcement.21 6 As a matter of public policy, there is no justification for
204. Compare Wyo. STAT. § 35-11-902(e) (Supp. 1983) and RCRA § 7002(e), 42 U.S.C. §
6972(e) (1976).
205. Wyo. STAT. § 35-11-902(e) (Supp. 1983).
206. See supra text accompanying notes 134-137.
207. Wyo. STAT. § 1-14-126 (1977).
208. "[Tihe court may award .. . costs... as it deems right and equitable." d.
209. The court awarded costs to the prevailing party in an action for rescission of contract
where no money damages were awarded in Eldridge v. Rogers, 40 Wyo. 89, 275 P. 101
(1929). This is as far as the Wyoming court has gone.
210. Wyo. STAT. § 35-11-902(e) (Supp. 1983).
211. Wyo. STAT. §§ 6-3-204; 35-10-101 and 35-11401 (1977).
212. Id.; Wyo. STAT. § 35-11-102 (1977).
213. Id.
214. The littering statute (WYo. STAT. § 6-3-204(b) (1977)) states that it doesn't apply in this
situation.
215. Such a situation might arise, for instance, where the pollutor is exempt from operation of
federal or state environmental quality controls by virtue of the nature or the size of the

operation. As an example, RCRA permit requirements reach only those generators who
produce more than 1,000 kilograms per month of hazardous waste. 40 C.F.R. § 261.5

(1983).

216. Wyo. STAT. § 6-6-202 (1977).
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allowing citizen enforcement of one type of nuisance statute, while denying
it for another, particularly in light of the express allowance of citizen suits
against violators of WEQA.
B. State Common Law Causes of Action in Wyoming
The Supreme Court ruling in Sea Clammers 17 makes it clear federal
common law has been entirely pre-empted by federal environmental
legislation. 18 Pre-emption of state common law, however, presents an entirely different question. While federal courts are authorized to develop
federal common law only in very limited circumstances,21 9 state common
law is a primary source of law in the structure of our nation. Much of what
is now statutory law is in substance just a codification of the common law.
The Supreme Court has not yet directly addressed the question, but the
Sea Clmmers opinion seems to assume the savings clause of the Clean
Water Act preserves state common law claims. 220 Other courts have so
held.2 2 1 The legislative history of the citizen suit clauses supports preservation of such claims. 2 2 2 If these saving clauses are to be construed to mean
anything at all, such a conclusion is unavoidable.
The Wyoming Supreme Court has reached the same conclusion regarding the savings clause of WEQA. 223 In Belle Fourche, the court stated:
Although recovery for damages resulting from pollution of the
groundwater in violation of the Wyoming Environmental Quality
Act could be had under existing remedies such as trespass or
nuisance224actions, § 35-11-902(g), supra, those damages must be
proven.
Clearly, state common law actions are preserved in Wyoming.
A central issue in any action based on the common law is whether compliance with the statutory requirements of environmental legislation (i.e.
permits and the conditions imposed by them) is a defense in a common law
action. The Wyoming Supreme Court has not yet addressed the
question. 228 The overwhelming majority of courts which have been con217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

223.
224.
225.

453 U.S. 1 (1981).
See supra text accompanying notes 149-163.
Id.
33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1977). See 453 U.S. at 20, n.31, where the Court acknowledges Congress' clear legislative intent to preserve state common law.
See, e.g., Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982); and
Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Services, Inc., 77 Ill. App. 3d 618, 396 N.E. 2d 552, reh'g
denied (1979); affid and remanded, 86 Ill. 2d 1, 426 N.E.2d 824, reh'g denied (1981).
[TIhe [savings clause] would specifically preserve any rights or remedies under
any other law. Thus if damages could be shown, other remedies would remain
available. Compliance with requirements under this Act would not be a defense
to a common law action for pollution damages.
S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (quoted in BATrLE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, PART
IV, THE CLEAN WATER ACT at 193 (1982)).
Wyo. STAT. § 35-11-902(g) (Supp. 1983).
669 P.2d at 511.
In Belle Fourche,the court held a violation of WEQA was also actionable under common
law theories. In that case, there was no question WEQA had not been complied with;
therefore the court did not address the question whether absent a WEQA violation a common law action could be maintained.
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fronted with a defense of statutory compliance have held compliance does
not bar the common law claim. 22 6 The policy justifications offered by those
courts which have barred state common law claims are founded in
deference to the technological expertise of permitting agencies and a desire
to avoid embroiling courts in the complex
factual questions inherent in
2 27
determining reasonable pollution levels.
The legislative history of the savings clauses in federal environmental
legislation is clear that no such defense was intended. "Compliance with requirements under this Act would not be a defense to a common law action
for pollution damages. ' 228 Traditional tort principles also suggest that
although compliance is quite relevant to findings of nuisance or negligence,
it is not a complete defense. 22 9
The common law offers a variety of potential causes of action which
might be employed in Wyoming. This article provides only a brief overview
of each without attempting to discuss finer points of procedure and proof.
1. Nuisance
A common law
nuisance action is available in Wyoming as a remedy for
2 30
pollution damage.
There are two categories of nuisance: public and private. "A public
nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right common to the
general public. ' 21 A private individual can recover for a public nuisance if
1) he can demonstrate harm of a kind different from that suffered by the
general public, or 2) he can obtain standing to represent the general public,
perhaps through a class action. 28 2 "A private nuisance is a nontrespassory
'2 3
invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land. 8
It can be284
remedied only by those who possess property rights in the land
affected.
Private nuisance was the cause of action most frequently employed to
remedy pollution of groundwater through percolation before enactment of
RCRA and CERCLA. 235 Courts which have denied relief based on strict
226. See, e.g., Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Services, Inc., 77 In.
App. 3d 618,396 N.E. 2d 552,
reh'g denied (1979); arfd and remanded, 86 Ill.
2d 1, 426 N.E.2d 824, reh'g denied (1981)
(operation of landfill in compliance with state permit is not a defense to a common law
nuisance action). For a catalog of similar cases, see Trauberman, Common Law Nuisance
in Hazardous Waste Litigation: Has It Survived Milwaukee H?, 13 ENVT'L. L. REP.
10043, 10044 (1983). But see New England Legal Foundation v. Costle, 666 F.2d 30 (2nd
Cir. 1981) (common law nuisance action barred because EPA had approved emission); and
Rollins Environmental Services of Louisiana, Inc. v. Iberville Parish Police Jury, 371
So.2d 1127 (La. 1979) (RCRA regulates the entire field of solid waste disposal).
227. See New England Legal Foundation v. Costle, 666 F.2d 30 (2nd Cir. 1981).
228. S. REP. No. 414, supra note 222.
229. Trauberman, supra note 226, at 10043.
230. Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. v. Elmore Livestock Co., 669 P.2d 505, 511 (Wyo. 1983).
Wyoming case law does not define the common law action of nuisance, therefore the
discussion here is confined to a survey of general common law principles.
231. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 821B (1) (1977).
232. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 821C (1977).
233. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 821D (1977).
234. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 821E (1977).
235. Davis, GroundwaterPollution:CaseLaw TheoriesFor Relief, 39 MISSouRI L. REv. 117,
120 (1974). RCRA was enacted in 1976; CERCLA in 1980.
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liability often have imposed a strict liability standard under the name of
nuisance, 236 since it, like strict liability, addresses the reasonableness of the
the activity.28 7 Nuisance allows
impact rather than the reasonableness of
238
for liability without proving culpability.
2. Trespass
trespass is clearly an available remedy in Wyoming for
Like nuisance,2 39
pollution damage.
To maintain a cause of action in trespass, it is necessary to prove a
physical invasion of an interest in real property. Underground ditch
seepage has been held to be a physical invasion constituting a trespass in
Wyoming;240 therefore, seepage from a hazardous waste dumpsite onto or
under the property of another which causes harm would be actionable.
3. Strict liabilityfor abnormally dangerous activities
One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is liable for harm
to another which results from the activity without regard to the negligence
or carefulness of the actor. 241 Whether an activity is abnormally dangerous
is a fact question which is resolved by balancing the risk and magnitude of
the harm against the ability to eliminate the risk, the unusual nature of the
activity, the propriety of the location of the activity, and the benefit to the
community of the activity.2 42 Of particular relevnace to old hazardous
waste sites, the fact that disposal was accomplished in accordance with the
is not a defense.243 Neither is disposal
best available technology at the time 244
custom.
industry
with
in compliance
Few courts
have been willing to extend strict liability to pollution
2
problems. "
4. Negligence
Historically, groundwater pollution has often been attacked through
negligence actions.2 46 Under negligence theory, a polluter "will be liable
for his pollution if he knew or should have known that his activity would be
likely to cause the injury which occurred. 2 47 Negligence addresses the
nuisance and strict liability address
reasonableness of the activity, whereas
2 48
the reasonableness of the impact.
236. Baurer, supra note 16, at 141.
237. Davis, supra note 235, at 126.
238. Id. at 124.
239. See Belle Fourche Pipeline Co. v. Elmore Livestock Co., 669 P.2d 505, 511 (Wyo. 1983).
240. Taylor Ditch Co. v. Carey. 520 P.2d 218 (Wyo. 1974).
241. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 519 (1976).
242. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 520 (1976).
243. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 520, comment b (1976).
244. The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).

245. Davis, supranote 235, at 120. The minority which has imposed strict liability has done so
in cases involving the oil and gas, mining and manufactured gas industries. Id. at 136-37.
But see Cities Service Co. v. Florida, 312 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 1975).
246. Davis, supra note 235, at 120.
247. Id. at 125.
248. Id. at 126.
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The problems of proof in a negligence action are even more difficult
than those of other common law actions. In addition to proving causation,
plaintiff must also prove the injury and damage were foreseeable. 249 This is
indeed a high hurdle since it may be a very long time between disposal and
damage, and damage may only become apparent after years of exposure. 210
The polluter can argue, and can often prove, that the risks weren't even
known to exist at the time of disposal.
This variety of available common law actions is helpful only if they can
be maintained against financially responsible parties. Obviously the owner
of a landfill or the person who brings the waste to the site and dumps it can
be held responsible for ensuing damage. 21' But often these are small
business people and truckers who have no resources with which to repair
manufacturer of the waste who is
the harm to the environment. It is the
252
most likely to be able to clean it up.
If it can be shown the generator knew or had reason to know its hazardous waste was likely to cause harm when he hired an independent contractor to haul it away, the generator can be held liable for the harm which
results.2 68 Of course, proving that hazardous wastes of a particular
at a particular disposal site can be an almost insurgenerator ended up
25 4
mountable burden.
A key impediment to common law actions seeking remedies for improper hazardous waste disposal is the statute of limitations. Wyoming imposes a four year limitation on such actions. 255 It has, however, adopted the
"rule of discovery" to determine when an action accrues: that is, "the
period of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to
know the existence of a cause of action." 256 If an act is done which is not
itself unlawful, and damage resulting from the267act occurs later, a cause of
action accrues when the damage is sustained.
Costs are recoverable in the discretion of the court.258 The Wyoming
in cases where only
courts have allowed costs to the prevailing party
2 59
equitable relief (no money damages) was granted.
249. Meyer, supra note 3, at 713.
250. Id.
251. United States v. Price (Price I), 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 204 (3d
Cir. 1982).
252. Cf.United States v. Price (Price III), 13 ENVrL. L. RE. 20843 (D.N.J. 1983).
253. City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1153 (E.D. Pa. 1982)
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 448 (1965)).
254. This burden is much less heavy since enactment of RCRA, which requires detailed record
keeping showing where and how each generator's wastes are disposed of. See 42 U.S.C.
255.
256.
257.
258.

§§ 6922-6925 (1976).
Wyo. STAT. § 1-3-105(a) (iv) (A) and (C) (1977).

Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 346 n.8 (Wyo. 1979).
Banner v. Town of Dayton, 474 P.2d 300 (Wyo. 1970).
Wyo. STAT. § 1-14-126 (1977), quoted supra note 208. Note, however, that in nuisance actions no costs may be awarded absent assessment of at least five dollars in damages.
WYo. STAT.

§

1-14-125 (1977).

259. Eldridge v. Rogers, 40 Wyo. 89, 275 P. 101 (1929).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The private individual who wants cleanup of a hazardous waste dump in
Wyoming has myriad remedial tools availble to her. They can be employed
singly or in tandem; they encompass a variety of potential fact situations.
The whole field of hazardous waste cleanup is new and the remedies
described herein are largely untried. The Wyoming Supreme Court has ruled on only two environmental cases so far, so it is impossible to predict its
hospitality to this sort of litigation. Both decisions favored environmental
interests, but each mut be limited to its particular facts.
Unquestionably, hazardous waste litigation is risky and extremely costly. But the potential damage to our environment from improper toxic waste
disposal is sobering. These remedies should be tried.
JERI L. BIDINGER
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